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REVISED RULE 55 REVISITED
John T Holleman IV
I. INTRODUCTION
Two Arkansas attorneys, one a distinguished professor, the other a
perceptive student, have made detailed inquiries into the body of default
judgment law in Arkansas.' This article is a further study into this critical and
unique area of litigation practice. Our supreme court has handed down several
defaultjudgment cases since the earlier articles. These cases provide valuable
insight into this evolving area of law. Professor Watkins summarizes: "[this]
court has handed down nine decisions in which the propriety of a default
judgment was at issue and has upheld the trial judge in all of them."2 Since
Professor Watkins' 1996 article, the Arkansas Supreme Court has handed
down five additional decisions involving default judgments.3 In all of these
cases, the supreme court upheld the trial judge's discretion in entering the
defaults, except for Richardson v. Rodgers.4 Whether the court will continue
this trend, in light of the anomalous decision of Richardson v. Rodgers, is
anybody's guess.
Prior to the Richardson decision, a defaulting defendant had two major
hurdles to leap to set aside a defaultjudgment.5 First, the defaulting defendant
must meet one of the four provisions of Rule 55(c)(1-4).6 Second, the
* John T. Holleman, IV is a partner in Jewell, Moser, Fletcher & Holleman, a Little
Rock, Arkansas law firm, where he practices exclusively in the area of personal injury litigation
(plaintiff and defense). He is a 1990 graduate of the University of Arkansas School of Law
(J.D.) and a 1992 graduate of the Tulane University School of Law (LL.M.).
1. See John J. Watkins, Revised Rule 55, Five Years Later, 49 ARK. L. REV. 23 (1996);
Mark A. Mayfield, Setting Aside Default Judgments in Arkansas, 45 ARK. L. REV. 971 (1993).
2. Watkins, supra note 1, at 57. These Arkansas cases are Martin v. Jetkins, 320 Ark.
478, 897 S.W.2d 567 (1995); Truhe v. Grimes, 318 Ark. 117,884 S.W.2d 255 (1994); Harold
M v. Clark, 316 Ark. 439,872 S.W.2d 410 (1994); Arnold& Arnoldv. Williams, 315 Ark. 632,
870 S.W.2d 365 (1994); Hubbardv. Shores Group, Inc., 313 Ark. 498,855 S.W.2d 924 (1993);
Maple Leaf Canvas, Inc. v. Rogers, 311 Ark. 171, 842 S.W.2d 22 (1992); Divelbliss v. Suchor,
311 Ark. 8, 841 S.W.2d 600 (1992), B & FEng'g, Inc. v. Cotroneo, 309 Ark. 175, 830 S.W.2d
835 (1992); Arnold Fireworks Display, Inc. v. Schmidt, 307 Ark. 316, 820 S.W.2d 444 (1991).
3. See Tharp v. Smith, 326 Ark. 260, 930 S.W.2d 350 (1996); Reeves v. Hinkle, 326
Ark. 724,934 S.W.2d 216 (1996); Southern Transit Co. v. Collums, 333 Ark. 170, 966 S.W.2d
906 (1982); Layman v. Bone, 333 Ark. 121, 967 S.W.2d 561 (1998); Richardson v. Rodgers,
334 Ark. 606, 976 S.W.2d 941 (1998).
4. 334 Ark. 606, 976 S.W.2d 941 (1998). Also, in Tharp v. Smith, the trial court had
mistakenly entered judgment as to damages without conducting a hearing. The Rules of Civil
Procedure make clear that a hearing is to be held, so the court reversed on that issue but upheld
the trial judge's entering a default as to liability.
5. See Tharp, 326 Ark. at 260, 930 S.W.2d at 350.
6. See id. These elements will be discussed in detail later in this article.
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defendant must present a meritorious defense to the action.7 However, after
Richardson it appears the above showing is obviated if the defendant can
successfully assert that the "trial court improperly enter[ed] a default
judgment."'
II. THE DISCRETIONARYNATURE OF THEINQUIRY
In Truhe v. Grimes, the court indelibly marked on paper its position that
trial courts have "wide discretion" with respect to default judgments.9 Of
course, such discretion is vested with the trial court because it is better
positioned to observe the circumstances of a particular case.' More
importantly, prior to 1990, a trial court was required to enter a default
judgment whenever a party failed to appear or defend." The former language
of the rule provided that a default judgment "shall" be entered. 2
Revised Rule 55(a) uses discretionary "may" language, thus vesting trial
courts with considerable latitude before the judgment is ever entered. 3 But
this discretionary power in entering the default "should not be confused with
[the] discretionary power to set aside."'4 A well-reasoned decision by the
Arkansas Court of Appeals manifests the distinction:
A judgment by default is just as binding and forceful as ajudgment entered
after a trial on the merits in a case; and it is not to be discredited or
regarded lightly because of the manner in which it was acquired. A default
judgment determines a plaintiff's right to recover and a defendant's
liability just as any conventional judgment or decree. It has been stated
authoritatively that an additional purpose of the entry of a default judgment
is to keep the dockets current and expedite disposal of litigation, thereby
preventing dilatory tactics on the part of a defendant from impeding the
plaintiff in the establishment of his claim.'"
As the court of appeals indicates, an attack on a final judgment is not to
be taken lightly. 6 "Frequent grants of relief from default judgment also
7. See id.
8. See Richardson, 334 Ark. at 606, 976 S.W.2d at 941.
9. See Truhe, 318 Ark. at 117, 884 S.W.2d at 256.
10. See Mayfield, supra note 1, at 991.
11. See Mayfield, supra note 1, at 990.
12. See Mayfield, supra note 1, at 990.
13. See Mayfield, supra note 1, at 990; ARK. R. CIv. P. 55(a).
14. See Mayfield, supra note 1, at 990.
15. Meisch v. Brady, 270 Ark. 652,658,606 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Ark. App. 1980) (internal
citations and punctuation omitted).
16. See Mayfield, supra note 1, at 990.
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impair its effectiveness as a penalty. Consequently, relief from default
judgment is more difficult to obtain than the initial judgment."' 7
Certainly, under the pre-1990 language of Rule 55 mandating entry of a
default judgment when a party has failed to defend, it is understandable that
appellate courts would scrutinize these decisions with a careful eye. But with
the latitude given trial courts in revised Rule 55, it has been nearly impossible
to challenge a judge's discretion surrounding a default judgment: hence, the
reason the court had to circumvent Rule 55 in its Richardson decision.
8
The Reporter's Notes to revised Rule 55 suggest that the factors
embraced by federal courts should guide a trial court's analysis when deciding
whether or not to enter a default judgment. 9 The federal courts have made
clear "a stricter standard applies for setting aside a default judgment once it
has ripened into ajudgment [because of the] public policy favoring finality of
judgments and termination of litigation."2 When a trial judge has presided
over a detailed hearing on damages and carefully reviewed all aspects of a
case, then granted a default judgment, his or her discretion in doing so should
generally not be questioned, especially in light of the final judgment and the
notion that litigation should end.2 The appropriate standard of review is
whether the trial judge abused his discretion-an onerous burden for an
appellant to carry.22
As the foregoing discussion manifests, and as Professor Watkins points
out, "Arkansas appellate courts, in contrast to their federal counterparts, will
give extraordinary deference to trial judges in Rule 55(c) cases."23 "To be
sure, not every mistakejustifies setting aside a defaultjudgment, and the court
correctly held in Divelbliss that unexplained carelessness will not suffice."24
As will be explained in detail later in this article, before the Richardson
decision, the defending party needed to show a reason why it failed to appear
or defend the suit. Failure to do so would decide the case.
17. See Mayfield, supra note 1, at 990.
18. See Richardson, 334 Ark. at 606, 976 S.W.2d at 941.
19. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 55 (Addition to Reporter's Notes, 1990 Amendment).
20. Waifersong, Ltd. v. Classic Music Vending, 976 F.2d 290, 292 (6th Cir. 1992); See
also Watkins, supra note 1, at 35 n.57.
21. See Watkins, supra note 1, at 35 n.57.
22. See B & F Eng'g Inc. v. Cotroneo, 309 Ark. 175, 181, 830 S.W.2d 835, 838 (1992).
A 1996 article in The Arkansas Lawyer indicates that an excellent way to write a losing brief
is for the appellant to pretend a standard of review does not exist. See Collen M. Barger, How
To Write A Losing Brief, 30 ARK. LAW., Spring 1996, at 10.
23. Watkins, supra note 1, at 43.
24. Watkins, supra note 1, at 43 (citations omitted).
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In Divelbliss v. Suchor,25 the trial court entered a default judgment,
refused to set it aside, and an appeal ensued. On appeal, the Arkansas
Supreme Court affirmed, stating:
There is no showing that the agent made an excusable mistake, or that there
was some inadvertent occurrence, or that any excusable neglect took place.
The trial court found, "The agent apparently did not tend to business." The
proof in the record discloses nothing more than carelessness on the part of
the agent, and, on such proof, the trial court ruled correctly in refusing to
set aside the default judgments.26
Professor Watkins states this result is "surely correct if no evidence had been
offered to explain the agent's failure to 'tend to business."'27 This follows our
courts' unequivocal mandate that "[a]ll litigants... must conform to the rules
... or else demonstrate good cause for not doing so."2
As previously mentioned, the Reporter's Notes to Rule 55 indicate the
factors used by federal courts should inform a judge in exercising his or her
discretionary power to grant or deny a defaultjudgment.29 These touchstones
are: (1) whether the default is largely technical; (2) whether prejudice to the
plaintiff has resulted from the defendant's failure to appear or respond; (3)
whether the defendant is ready to defend; and (4) whether thejudgment would
later be set aside for the standards listed in Rule 55(c).30
One of the more interesting cases discussing the above-described factors
is B & F Engineering, Inc. v. Cotroneo.a' In that case, the plaintiff moved for
and received a default judgment when the defendant, whose drunk employee
caused a horrible automobile accident, failed to answer within 20 days.32 The
defendant answered nine days late.3 Following a hearing, the trial judge
entered a default judgment on liability, and the subsequent jury trial on
damages resulted in the plaintiff being awarded $1.5 million in compensatory
and $1 million in punitive damages.34
25. 311 Ark. 8, 841 S.W.2d 600 (1992).
26. Id. at 13, 841 S.W.2d at 602-03.
27. Watkins, supra note 1, at 43.
28. Arnold & Arnold v. Williams, 315 Ark. 632, 638, 870 S.W.2d 365, 368 (1994).
29. See ARK. R. CIrv. P. 55 (Addition to Reporter's Notes, 1990 Amendment).
30. See id. In discussing Rule 55(c)(4), one Arkansas commentator has noted, "[t]his
provision, which is rarely used, is unpredictable because decisions are based on subjective
factors. In effect, the court is making new default judgment law. If this is the sole standard for
relief, the chances of success are slight." Mayfield, supra note i, at 992-93.
31. 309 Ark. 175, 830 S.W.2d 835 (1992).
32. See id. at 177, 830 S.W.2d at 836.
33. See id., 830 S.W.2d at 836.
34. See id., 830 S.W.2d at 836.
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The supreme court resoundingly affirmed on appeal with only onejustice
dissenting.35 As Professor Watkins discusses in his article, "[t]his case was
a prime candidate for application of Rule 55(a)."36 His commentary is
certainly worth quoting in its entirety:
First, the default was technical in nature and the defendant filed an
answer shortly after the plaintiff moved for a defaultjudgment. Second, the
defendant's failure could be attributed to a good faith mistake; this was one
of two lawsuits filed in the same court as a result of the accident, and the
defendant's insurance company filed a timely answer to the other
complaint. Third, as the majority conceded in its discussion of Rule 55(c),
the plaintiff would not have suffered "substantial prejudice" had the
motion for default judgment been denied. Fourth, the amount of money at
stake was not insignificant, witness the $2.4 million jury award. Finally,
the effect of the default judgment was quite harsh, since the defendant was
prevented from litigating liability in a case stemming from the drunken
driving of an employee who had previously been dependable.37
Premised on the court's holding in B & F Engineering, Inc. v. Cotroneo, it
appeared the only result which could follow in most default judgment cases
was the trial court's discretion being left intact. But Richardson v. Rodgers
has entered the picture.
In the fourteen cases decided by the supreme court since the revision of
Rule 55, the apparent application of these four factors has resulted in the trial
judges' discretion being upheld in all cases but Richardson v. Rodgers,38 the
court's most recent study of Rule 55.
In Richardson, the court found the trial court mistaken in its refusal to set
aside a defaultjudgment when an answering co-defendant had filed an answer
asserting defenses common to both defendants.39 Interestingly, the court held
that "Rule 55(c) does not govern when the trial court improperly enters a
default judgment by failing to recognize clear authority in an area. "40
However, the appellant never argued that 55(c) did not apply and sought
to utilize the subsection to have the judgment set aside.4 The supreme court
brought the issue up sua sponte, and reversed and remanded."2 One might ask
how a trial judge could have abused his discretion for applying Rule 55(c)
35. See id. at 183-89, 830 S.W.2d at 840-42.
36. Watkins, supra note 1, at 35.
37. Watkins, supra note 1, at 35-36.
38. See Richardson, 334 Ark. at 606, 976 S.W.2d at 941. This case was litigated and
handled on appeal by the author of this article.
39. See id at 610, 976 S.W.2d at 943.
40. See id. at 612, 976 S.W.2d at 944.
41. See id. at 611, 976 S.W.2d at 944.
42. See id. at 611-12, 976 S.W.2d at 944.
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when the defaulting party embraced the rule in attempting to overturn the
default.43 Moreover, if appellate courts choose to ignore the Rule 55(c)
factors whenever they believe a trial court has "improperly"" entered a default
judgment, is not the rule and the decisions flowing therefrom vitiated?
The only intellectually and procedurally consistent path for the court to
follow in Richardson was application of the two hurdle Rule 55(c) analysis.
The common defense doctrine, used to wholly circumvent the rule, was simply
a meritorious defense, thus meeting the second hurdle of Rule 55(c). But prior
to jumping the second hurdle, the Richardson appellant should have been
required to hop the first hurdle of Rule 5 5(c)( 1-4) by asserting a reason why
it failed to appear or defend. This was the path required to be followed by
prior appellants.
But, Justice Glaze, writing for a unanimous court in Richardson stated,
What neither party recognizes, though, is that there is a difference between
a trial court's decision to enter a default judgment and its refusal to set one
aside. Rule 55(c) contemplates a circumstance where a default judgment
has been entered properly. Rule 55(c) does not govern when the trial court
improperly entered a default judgment by failing to recognize clear
authority in an area. In this case, the area of clear authority is that of the
common defense doctrine.4
But in Richardson, the default had matured into ajudgment in the amount of
$1,500,000.00.46 The trial court subsequently refused to set aside the default
premised on Rule 55(c). 47
Interestingly, the supreme court heard a default judgment case involving
the common defense doctrine in 1991 - seven years prior to Richardson. In
ArnoldFireworks Display, Inc. v. Schmidt4 a defaulting defendant's untimely
answer was stricken. 49 A co-defendant had filed a timely answer exactly as
in Richardson. Both the trial and appellate courts reviewed the case under
the recently revised Rule 55(c)," and the supreme court affirmed the trial
judge's award of the default. This is in stark contrast to the Richardson
decision where the common defense doctrine was used to take the case out of
the framework of Rule 55(c).
43. See id., 976 S.W.2d at 944.
44. See Richardson, 334 Ark. at 612, 976 S.W.2d at 944.
45. See id., 976 S.W.2d at 944.
46. See id at 609, 976 S.W.2d at 943.
47. See id., 976 S.W.2d at 943.
48. 307 Ark. 316, 820 S.W.2d 444 (1991).
49. See id. at 318, 820 S.W.2d at 445.
50. See id., 820 S.W.2d at 445.
51. See id., 820 S.W.2d at 445.
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Although the supreme court held the common defense doctrine was
inapplicable inArnoldFireworks, the court followed the two-pronged analysis
of Rule 55(c). 2 The defaulting defendants in Arnold Fireworks provided no
reason why they failed to appear or defend, so their appeal failed.53 One must
ask if the two-factor analysis was applied in Arnold Fireworks, why was Rule
55(c) not embraced in Richardson? Both cases involved defaulting co-
defendants and the common defense doctrine.
It appears that post-Richardson, the Rule 55(c) factors will no longer be
the first focus of inquiry into whether the default judgment will be disturbed.
Richardson adds a step, absent supporting authority, before Rule 55(c) is
initially addressed. 4 A litigant must first make a determination as to whether
the default judgment has been "entered properly."" Only then does the Rule
55(c) analysis come into play.
HI. APPLICATION OF RULE 55(C)
Rule 55(c) has two additional hurdles that must be cleared by a defendant
seeking to have a default judgment set aside. Rule 55 provides that a trial
court may set aside a default judgment due to: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) the judgment is void; (3) fraud, misrepre-
sentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; or (4) any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.5 6 Asserting and proving
one of the above factors as a reason why it failed to appear or defend is the
first hurdle the defending party needs to jump before having a default
judgment set aside. Justice Corbin, writing for a unanimous court in Tharp v.
Smith, explained the analysis best:
On this record, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in
finding that there was no excuse for [a]ppellant's default or that the trial
court failed to apply the relevant consideration of Rule 55(c).
Appellant cites Rule 55(c)(4) and argues that a miscarriage ofjustice
will result if he is not allowed to present a defense and that such miscar-
riage of justice constitutes "any other reason justifying relief from the
operation ofthejudgment." This is nothing more than a back-door attempt
to satisfy Rule 55(c), which requires, in effect, two steps to having a
default judgment set aside. First, a defaulting defendant must show one of
the four enumerated categories of reasons to have the judgment set aside.
52. See id. at 319-20, 820 S.W.2d at 446.
53. See id at 320, 820 S.W.2d at 446.
54. See Richardson, 334 Ark. at 611-12, 976 S.W.2d at 944.
55. See id. at 612, 976 S.W.2d at 944.
56. See ARK. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
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Second, if the reason is any other than that the judgment is void, a
defaulting defendant must then demonstrate a meritorious defense to the
action. Here, [a]ppellant argues that the "reason" to set aside the judgment
is because he has a meritorious defense and a miscarriage of justice will
result if he is not allowed to present it. This argument clearly circumvents
the dual requirements of Rule 55(c). Moreover, it ignores the cogent fact
that the reason [a]ppellant was not allowed to present a defense in the first
place is because of his own unexcusable default.
Because [a]ppellant did not file an answer or otherwise appear in this
case, [a]ppellee was entitled to the default as to liability without further
notice. 7
Obviously, the defending party must meet one of the Rule 55(c)(1-4)
factors in seeking to have a default judgment set aside. A careful analysis of
appellate decisions indicates the defaulting party must meet one of the factors
via an excuse for the failure to timely answer. Unless the judgment is void,
the Rule 55(c) factors must be met with a reason why the defendant failed to
appear or defend.
A review of the supreme court's defaultjudgment opinions manifests the
truism that a defaulting party must show one of the Rule 5 5(c)(1-4) factors as
a reason why they failed to appear or defend. This fact is clearly shown in
Tharp v. Smith58(stating that appellant claimed he was justified in failing to
answer but could not "back door" in his alleged meritorious defense to meet
the Rule 55(c)( 1-4) requirements); Martin v. Jetkins59 (alleging Rule 55(c)(1)
as a reason for the defendant's failure to appear and defend but no evidence
was presented so the defaultjudgment stood); Truhe v. Grimes' (holding that
insurance company's failure to tend to business did not constitute excusable
neglect so as to excuse the defendant's failure to appear or defend); Arnold &
Arnoldv. Williams6' (finding that defendant made no showing of unavoidable
casualty or delay, thus constituting a reason for him to fail to appear or
defend); Maple Leaf Canvas, Inc. v. Rogers62 (failing to file an answer
because no one opened the letter with summons and it sat on an insurance
agent's desk for over two months was not a valid excuse for the defendant's
failure to appear or defend); Divelbliss v. Suchorm (holding that default
judgment should not have been set aside when insurance agent simply failed
57. Tharp, 326 Ark. at 264-65, 930 S.W.2d at 353 (1996).
58. 326 Ark. 260, 264-65, 930 S.W.2d 350, 353 (1996).
59. 320 Ark. 478, 479, 897 S.W.2d 567, 567 (1995).
60. 318 Ark. 117, 120, 884 S.W.2d 255, 256 (1994).
61. 315 Ark. 632,636,870 S.W.2d 365, 366-67 (1994) (Hays, J., dissenting), cert. denied,
513 U.S. 990 (1994).
62. 311 Ark. 171, 174, 842 S.W.2d 22, 24 (1992).
63. 311 Ark. 8, 13,841 S.W.2d 600, 601-02 (1992).
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to get the complaint answered, Rule 5 5(c)( 1-4) factors simply not met under
this circumstance); B & F Engineering, Inc. v. Cotroneo" (insurer failing to
notify counsel of an additional complaint was not a reason to fail to appear or
defend under Rule 55(c)(1)); and in ArnoldFireworks Display, Inc. v.
Schmidt5 (holding there was no meaningful evidence in the case of a mistake
or inadvertent failure to file an answer, this was not ajustifiable reason for the
defendant to fail to appear or defend).
In reviewing how the Arkansas Supreme Court has analyzed the 55(c)(1-
4) factors, this author was reminded of a Dr. Leflar lecture in Conflicts. Dr.
Leflar described his analysis of many cases throughout the country and how
courts made choice-of-law decisions. Ultimately, all the complex decisions
led to Dr. Leflar's observation that five basic factors govern choice-of-law.'
A similar study of default judgment cases makes clear that the 55(c) factors
are always reasons why the defendant failed to appear or defend.
Rule 55(c) has a second hurdle that a party must overcome to set aside
a default judgment. "The party seeking to have the judgment set aside must
demonstrate a meritorious defense to the action ... ."" As the decisions
indicate, this second hurdle has been difficult to jump.
The supreme court stated with unmistakable clarity in B&FEngineering,
Inc. v. Cotroneo that,
A majority of courts that have considered the question refuse to accept
general denials or conclusory statements that a defense exists and "the only
real exception to the requirement is where the judgment is void, such as for
lack of jurisdiction .... " The underlying basis for this theory is that to
determine whether there is a possibility that, after a full trial, the outcome
of the suit would be contrary to the result achieved by the default. Finding
an abuse of discretion where the appellant offers no defense is difficult to
say the least.6"
Further, in Truhe v. Grimes, the court stated that the issue of setting aside
default judgments "involves the sound discretion of the trial court.. . and
where the record is bereft of explanation for the failure to respond to a
complaint we are hard pressed to hold that an abuse of discretion occurred."69
Also, in Truhe, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to
refuse to consider a meritorious defense where the defendant offered no
64. 309 Ark. 175, 179, 830 S.W.2d 835, 836 (1992) (Brown, J., dissenting).
65. 307 Ark. 316, 318, 820 S.W.2d 444, 445 (1991).
66. See ROBERTA. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 277-79 (4th ed. 1986).
67. ARK. R. Crv. P. 55(c).
68. B & FEng'g, Inc., 309 Ark. at 180-81, 830 S.W.2d at 838 (citations omitted).
69. Truhe, 318 Ark. at 122, 884 S.W.2d at 258 (citations omitted).
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explanation for his failure to respond to the complaint.7" This same issue was
addressed in Maple Leaf Canvas, Inc. v. Rogers.7 Seeking relief from a
default judgment, the appellant in Maple Leaf argued it had a meritorious
defense. The court responded:
[Appellant] contends that no prejudice resulted to the appellees and that it
has a meritorious defense. [Appellant] however, must first satisfy the court
that a threshold reason exists for denying default judgment. The reason it
presents is not convincing. The failure to answer the complaint seems due
more to carelessness .... a result of not attending to business.72
Certainly, a defaulting party must have a solid meritorious defense if it has
any hope in challenging the default. Prior litigants have met with little
success.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Arkansas Supreme Court has upheld the trial judge in thirteen of
fourteen decisions in which a judge's discretion surrounding a default
judgment was being questioned.73 But with the Richardson v. Rodgers"
decision, a once clear area of the law is no longer so certain. First, the
defaulting party should claim the judgment was not "entered properly"
pursuant to Richardson. " This will be the easiest course of action because the
defendant avoids having to navigate Rule 55(c). All prior default judgment
decisions have been brought into question by the Richardson decision. At the
very least Arnold Fireworks has been overruled and an additional analytical
hurdle has been set forth prior to the two-factor Rule 55(c) analysis. A more
expansive reading of Richardson overrules all appellate decisions involving
Rule 55(c).
However, if the judgment in question is deemed to have been properly
entered, a defaulting defendant must then meet the first hurdle of Rule
55(c)(1-4) and clear the second hurdle of Rule 55(c) by demonstrating a
meritorious defense. A defendant without a reason why he failed to appear or
defend will meet with little success under Rule 55(c)(1-4). "Back door"
attempts at meeting the Rule 55(c)(1-4) factors will likely fail as they did in
Tharp.
70. See id., 884 S.W.2d at 258.
71. 311 Ark. 171, 842 S.W.2d 22 (1992).
72. Id. at 171, 842 S.W.2d at 23 (citation omitted).
73. See Watkins, supra note 1, at 57.
74. 334 Ark. 606, 976 S.W.2d 941 (1998).
75. See id. at 612, 976 S.W.2d at 944.
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Arkansas appellate courts failing to uphold a trial judge's discretion will
offend the sound logic of B & F Engineering, Inc. v. Cotroneo, where it was
stated:
Nevertheless, under the circumstances of this case we are constrained to
hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the default
judgment in favor of the appellant. To hold otherwise would, we believe,
give sanction to a slipshod treatment of writs of summons by defendants.76
No sound legal policy is embraced by slipshod conduct of litigants. And
once a default has matured into a judgment, the analytical framework to set
aside the judgment should be found solely within Rule 55(c). Further
guidance will be needed to determine if this is true in light of Richardson v.
Rodgers.
76. B & FEng'g, Inc., 309 Ark. at 179, 830 S.W.2d at 837.
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